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Recent financial reforms, such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation, encourage greater use of clearing and 
therefore increased margining of derivative trades. They also impose margining 
requirements on OTC derivative dealers. One question arising out of the debates over 
these reforms is, does a margin mandate increases the cost of hedging by non-financial 
corporations—the so-called end-users of derivatives? Our answer is, No. We show that a 
non-margined derivative is equivalent to a package of (i) a margined derivative, and (ii) 
a contingent line of credit. A margin mandate merely requires that this package be 
marketed as two distinct products, but it does not change the total financing or capital 
that the non-financial corporation requires to back its hedging. Nor does it raise the cost 
to banks or other dealer of offering the package, at least not directly. There may be an 
indirect effect if the clearing mandate succeeds in lowering systemic risk, but indirect 
macro effects such as this are beyond the scope of this paper. We also explore how 
accounting rules and bank regulations may treat the implicit credit embedded in the non-
margined derivative differently from an explicit line of credit. This is important to 
understanding business and banker reaction to details of the proposal. Finally, we place 
the current debate in the context of the historical evolution of margin practices and 
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“I strongly suspect the subject of margins wouldn’t even have been on your 
program a year or two ago. Other than for a speculator who just watched his 
long corn go limit down or his short soybeans go limit up, no one gave much 
thought to margins. Or to what they are, or what they do, or why we have 
them. A few years ago, in fact, our clearing corporation considered preparing 
a little booklet to explain margins. It never got published. The reaction to the 
idea ranged from an “ugh” to a “why?” The consensus was that margins are 
arcane, margins are dull, and, besides, who really cares? 
That I am on this side of the speaker’s table, that margins are on your 
program today, is one indication that the situation has rather suddenly 
changed. Commodity margins have suddenly become interesting. All at once, 
it seems that just about everyone cares. Market participants care. Newspaper 
and TV commentators care. Including those who’d barely even heard of 
futures markets until the day before yesterday. Government regulators care 
because there is no greater anathema than that which can be regulated but 
isn’t. Additionally, of course, there are all manner of congressional crisis 
chasers. They, too, express care.” 
 
Remarks by Walter Brinkman, President, Board of Trade Clearing 
Corporation, at a conference on speculation held in 1980 after the dramatic 
collapse of the Hunt brothers’ silver corner following a change in the margin 
requirement. Brinkman (1981) 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a company hedges with a derivative sold on an exchange such as the CME, 
ICE or Eurex, which use central counterparty clearing, the company is generally required 
to post margin. However, if the derivative is sold over the counter (OTC) by a dealer 
bank, it may not be cleared and the company may not have to post margin. The terms of 
the OTC derivative contract are up to the two counterparties. Oftentimes companies are 
required to post margin, but other times they are not. Even when a company must post 
margin, the terms governing when and how much is to be posted may differ from the 
terms imposed by a clearinghouse. Recent regulatory actions introduced after the 
financial crisis of 2008 encourage greater use of clearing and therefore increased 
margining of derivative trades. They also impose margining requirements on OTC 
derivative dealers. These changes have significant implications on how corporations 
hedge with financial derivatives. In this paper we review these changes and the 
implications to corporations, having in mind the value to the hedger of being granted the 
hedge with and without having to post margin. Our focus is on non-financial 
corporations—the so-called end-users of derivatives—seeking to hedge commercial risks, 
as opposed to financial speculators of various stripes and as opposed to financial 
intermediaries like the dealer banks. Do margins significantly impact the cost of hedging 
and the way corporations hedge commercial risks? 
Since the debate leading to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. in June 
2010, and the EMIR in Europe this issue has been very prominent. A large number of 
corporations complained that the requirement to post margin would significantly raise the 
cost of hedging, and they demanded an exemption. For example, in a hearing in the U.S. 
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House of Representatives in 2009 discussing the Treasury Department’s proposal, 
Timothy Murphy, the Foreign Currency Risk Manager for the 3M Company testified 
that: 
While we are mindful of the reduction in credit risk inherent in a clearing or 
exchange  environment, robust margin requirements would create substantial 
incremental liquidity and administrative burdens for commercial users, resulting 
in higher financing and operational costs. Capital currently deployed in growth 
opportunities would need to be maintained in a clearinghouse. This could result in 
slower job creation, lower capital expenditures, less R&D and/or higher costs to 
consumers. Murphy (2009) 
In January 2010, the European Assocation of Corporate Treasurers submitted an Open 
Letter to the Commissioners of the European Union stating that: 
We are deeply concerned by some of the proposed reforms to the OTC derivatives 
market currently being considered, in that they will disadvantage many end users 
who rely on OTC derivatives to hedge underlying commercial exposures. 
Specifically, the intent to drive OTC derivative transactions into central clearing 
and onto exchanges will increase liquidity risk and funding costs through the 
requirement to post cash collateral… EACT (2010)  
Ultimately, both the Dodd-Frank Act and the EMIR included some exemptions from the 
clearing mandate for derivatives bought by end-users for commercial hedging purposes. 
Debate continues, however, as the terms of these exemptions are specified in the 
implementing regulations, as legislators consider expanding or narrowing the 
exemptions, and as related banking and other regulations are written which impinge on 
margin and related credit practices.  
We argue in this paper that these complaints about the costs imposed by a margin 
mandate are misguided. Our central point is that the cost normally attributed to the 
margin mandate is actually attributable to the underlying credit risk inherent in the 
derivative transaction. A mandate to post margin is just one way in which this cost can be 
pushed onto the company hedging with a derivative. If, instead, a dealer sells the 
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company an OTC derivative without any margin requirement, the same cost arises and is 
paid by the company but in a different form. The non-margined derivative entails greater 
credit risk, and the dealer charges for that, building in an extra premium to the bid-ask 
spread. It is the same cost of hedging, just paid for in a different guise. Negotiating an 
OTC derivative transaction does not magically reduce the credit risk inherent in the 
transaction, thereby lowering the real cost of hedging. The funding or liquidity which the 
non-margined derivative provides can be replicated by a margined derivative and a 
contingent line of credit that funds the margin. The contingent line of credit poses exactly 
the same liquidity and credit risk to the bank as the credit embedded in the non-margined 
derivative. Consequently, the mandate to margin is only a mandate to separately account 
for the credit associated with the derivative. The margin mandate imposes no additional 
cost. 
Critics of a margin mandate often overlook the cost of credit that is implicit to a 
non-margined derivative sold OTC. However, some institutional practices may give rise 
to a real difference between credit that is implicit to a non-margined derivative contract 
and credit that must be granted explicitly to fund margin. We highlight two such 
practices. First, is the different accounting for the two types of credit. Second, is the 
different treatment by banking regulators which can create a difference in the cost passed 
to bank customers. Of course these institutional practices do not actually make the non-
margined derivative truly cheaper. There is no free lunch. But they can hide costs or 
misallocate them – e.g., letting taxpayers subsidize the credit risk in non-margined 
derivatives. 
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2. THE MECHANICS OF MARGIN A DERIVATIVES CONTRACT 
Given the wide variety of settings in which derivatives are traded, there is no 
single, standardized set of margin rules. Practice differ across markets—futures 
exchanges v. OTC swap markets—across classes of participants within a market—
clearinghouse members v. customers, hedgers v. speculators—across the life of a 
transaction—initial margin v. maintenance margin, v. delivery month margin, and in the 
OTC market across individual transactions. Throughout most of this paper, we abstract 
from these many details, and discuss the generic issues involved with the practice of 
charging margin. We focus on a non-financial company purchasing a derivative from a 
dealer bank and examine the same transaction done with and without margin. 
We construct a simple illustrative example of an oil-indexed swap contract 
negotiated between a non-financial company and a dealer bank. The swap is opened in 
November 2010 and has a single payment date three months later, in February 2011. The 
floating price is the price on an oil futures contract with delivery in March 2011. When 
the swap is opened in November 2010, the price on the March futures contract is 
$82.00/bbl, and this is the fixed price of the swap. The company buys the swap, i.e., takes 
a long position, and so in February 2011 it will receive the difference between the 
floating and the fixed prices multiplied times the notional quantity of oil specified in the 
swap. The notional quantity is 10 million barrels. Because the mark-to-market value of 
the swap, the final swap payment, and the margin cash flows depend upon the evolution 
of the oil futures price, both tables show results for two scenarios. Scenario #1 is a path in 
which the price falls through time, and Scenario #2 is a path in which the price rises.  
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Cash Flows on a Non-Margined Swap 
Table 1 shows the cash flows through time on a non-margined swap. In Scenario 
#1, the mark-to-market value of the swap declines by $10 million each month. The total 
loss in value at the close of the swap is $30 million. This loss is unrealized until the 
single payment date of February 2011, at which point the full $30 million is due. 
Scenario #2 is the mirror image. The mark-to-market value of the swap increases 
by $10 million each month. At the close of the swap, the total gain in value is $30 
million. This gain is unrealized until the single payment date of February 2011, at which 
point the full $30 million is received. 
Cash Flows on a Margined Swap 
Table 2 shows how things change when we add the obligation to post margin. The 
margin required is calculated off a base level of 15% of the notional value—the notional 
quantity times the current price on the March futures contract. However, we assume that 
the accrued mark-to-market gain or loss on the swap is credited or debited in calculating 
the required margin. For Scenario #1, line [10] shows the calculation of the 15% of 
notional value through time. Line [11] shows the calculation of net margin balance 
required, which is equal to the 15% of notional value less the mark-to-market value. At 
inception in November 2010, the futures price is $82/bbl, so the notional value is $820 
million and 15% of the notional value is $123 million. Since the mark-to-market value is 
zero at inception, the company must post the full $123 million margin to open the 
position. Line [12] shows the monthly cash flow to and from the margin account. To keep 
the calculations in the example simple, we ignore the interest earned on the margin 
account. Later we will discuss the opportunity cost of funding the margin account. In the 
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succeeding two months, as the swap position accrues losses, the company makes 
contributions to maintain the margin balance. In Scenario #1, as the mark-to-market value 
on the swap declines, the company must make offsetting contributions to the margin 
account. However, since the notional value of the swap is declining slightly, the required 
contribution to the margin account is slightly less than the accrued loss each month. 
When the swap is closed out in February 2011, the entire margin balance can be 
withdrawn. Line [13] shows the swap payment, and line [14] shows the net cash flow, 
which is the sum of the contributions to fund the margin account and the swap payment.1 
Lines [15]-[22] show the same calculations for Scenario #2. 
Comparing Table 2 against Table 1, we can see that the total net cash flow on the 
margined swap is the same as the total net cash flow on the non-margined swap. But the 
timing of the cash flows is different due to the requirement to post margin. The margined 
swap forces potential losses to be pre-funded. If the losses do not materialize, then the 
money is returned. Hence, margin is often described as a performance bond.  
3. MARGINS, CREDIT RISK AND THE COST OF HEDGING 
Posting margin is a claim on scarce capital, and therefore buying a hedge and 
posting margin is costly. Other things equal, companies would prefer to hedge without 
posting margin. Other things equal, a higher margin raised the cost of hedging, thus 
reducing the amount of hedging. This, in turn, would increase expected financing costs, 
lowering the scale of investments and the value of firms. This is the argument made by 
critics of mandated margins. 
                                                 
1 The table has ignored interest earned on the margin account for the purpose of keeping the example as 
simple as possible. 
 Page 10 
The problem with this argument is the premise that one can avoid posting margin 
while keeping other things equal. Posting margin minimizes the credit risk borne by the 
bank selling the derivative. If the bank, instead, sells a non-margined derivative, then the 
bank shoulders credit risk not present in the margined derivative. This is costly for the 
bank, and it will charge the company accordingly. Most likely the company pays through 
the pricing terms on the non-margined swap. 
It is illusory for a non-financial company to imagine that by negotiating a non-
margined swap it is conserving its scarce capital. In taking the implicit credit embedded 
in the non-margined swap, the company is using up some of its debt capacity, just as it 
used its scarce capital when it had to fund the margin account. The funding of a margin 
account just makes explicit the drain on the company’s scarce capital. When agreeing to 
sell a non-margined derivative, the dealer bank calculates the potential size of the liability 
that might accrue. The bank’s credit committee will have to approve the derivative, just 
as if the derivative included a loan. Before approving the deal, the credit committee will 
review the company’s file, examining its current credit rating, the set of other liabilities it 
has outstanding, its current cash flow situation and so on. If the company has already 
used up all of its debt capacity, the bank is not going to approve the derivative. It will 
only approve the derivative if the company has some unused debt capacity, and the bank 
will count on that unused debt capacity to assure that the bank gets paid in the event that 
the price of the derivative moves against the company. Each non-margined derivative 
contract approved consumes some of the company’s debt capacity, so there is a limit to 
the volume of non-margined transactions the dealer bank will approve. 
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To a first approximation, the cost of hedging with a non-margined swap must be 
the same as the cost of hedging with a margined swap once credit risk is taken into 
account. This is because the ultimate source of the cost is the same, and the decision to 
charge a margin simply changes the channel through which that cost manifests itself. 
When the company has to fund a margin account, it sees an explicit cost in the use of 
scarce cash. When the company negotiates a non-margined swap, the cost is embedded 
into the terms of the deal, and the consumption of debt capacity is not explicit.  
Cash Flows on a Margined Swap Combined with a Contingent Line of Credit 
A powerful way to show these points is to replicate the cash flow structure of the 
non-margined swap using a margined swap packaged together with a credit arrangement 
that funds the margin account. A non-margined swap should be thought of as a package 
of (i) a margined swap, plus (ii) a contingent line of credit to fund the margin. The credit 
line is contingent because the amount drawn varies according to the changes in the value 
of the swap and the payments under the swap.  
To illustrate this, Table 3 extends our example to show the replication of the non-
margined swap cash flows using a margined swap plus a contingent line of credit. Under 
Scenario #1, lines [9]-[13] show the margined swap items and lines [14]-[15] show the 
contingent credit line items. The line is drawn on to fund the margin account, and paid 
down when the swap is closed out. Line [16] shows the combined net cash flow on the 
margined swap plus the credit line. Line [17] shows the difference between the net cash 
flow on this package and the net cash flow on a non-margined swap. The same set of 
results is shown for Scenario #2, with line [28] showing the difference between the net 
cash flow on this package and the net cash flow on a non-margined swap. The fact that 
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lines [17] and [28] are each zero in every period confirms that the combination of the 
margined swap and the contingent credit line replicates the cash flows to the non-
margined swap. This example shows just two scenarios for the movement in the index 
underlying the derivative, but the principle is clear, and one can extend the example to 
any arbitrary movement. In all cases, the cash flow obligations of the non-margined 
swap, on the one hand, and the margined swap plus a contingent line of credit, on the 
other hand, are identical. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the cash flows to the company buying the swap. The 
dealer bank selling the swap is on the opposite side of these cash flows. Therefore, the 
dealer bank that offers a company a non-margined swap has the exact same cash flow 
payoffs as a dealer bank that offers the package of (i) a margined swap, plus (ii) a 
contingent line of credit to fund the margin. 
A company that prefers the cash flow pattern of a non-margined swap can 
replicate it using a margined swap plus the contingent line of credit. Therefore, a margin 
mandate is nothing more than the requirement to make explicit the credit line embedded 
in a non-margined swap. 
Credit Risk and the Cost of Hedging 
Hedging is costly. But the real source of the cost is not the margin that is posted, 
but the underlying credit risk that motivates counterparties to demand that margin be 
posted. In Mello and Parsons (2000), we constructed a dynamic model of hedging and 
credit. A company has limited debt capacity and can hedge with a futures contract. There 
is no direct cost to using the futures contract. In particular, there is no formal margining 
and no margin charge. Nevertheless, the model shows that a company is very 
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conservative in its hedging. It hedges less than what would minimize the volatility of its 
cash flows or the volatility in its market value. Why? The answer is that, except in the 
extreme case when the hedge is perfect, hedging uses up the company’s scarce debt 
capacity. In practice, all hedges involve a certain amount of basis risk, and there will be 
some circumstances when the dealer is exposed to default by the hedger. This cost 
increases as the scale of the hedging gets larger. The dealer must charge for this credit 
risk, and it is the price paid to cover the credit risk that constrains a company from 
hedging more. So credit risk is the real underlying factor making hedging costly, not the 
cost of posting margin. To emphasize that credit risk is the key, one can examine the 
model for the case in which the hedge is perfect. In that case, the hedge creates its own 
liquidity and becomes costless. It completely eliminates the company’s limited debt 
capacity. The model therefore illustrates the fact that limited debt capacity and credit risk 
is the ultimate source of the cost of hedging. The practice of margining is just a channel 
through which the drain on the company’s debt capacity is made apparent to the 
company. Cooper and Mello (1999) also demonstrate how it is the interaction of the 
structure of the hedge with the determinants of a company’s credit quality that determines 
the optimal scale of hedging and the optimal structure of a hedge. 
The Cost of a Margin Mandate 
A mandate to margin all derivative transactions does not add any new cost to 
hedging. With a non-margined derivative, the company is procuring the two parts of the 
package rolled into one product: the credit is implicitly embedded in the terms of the 
contract. The margin mandate merely forces the credit to be marketed and accounted for 
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separately, as an explicit arrangement alongside the margined swap. The mandate does 
not add any cost to the company. 
In the course of debating the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, and then again in 
the debate over the regulations to implement the Act, a number of industry sponsored 
studies produced large estimates of the costs that would be imposed on non-financial 
companies if margins were mandated.  
For example, a Keybridge Research study commissioned by the Business 
Roundtable alleges that,  
… a 3% OTC derivative margin requirement might be expected to eliminate 
approximately 100,000 to 120,000 jobs economy wide. Keybridge Research 
(2011) 
The study treats the 3% margin requirement as a pure supplemental cash drain on 
corporate finances, based on the unspoken premise that non-margined derivatives impose 
no claim on companies’ available credit capacity. That is not a reasonable premise. 
Derivative dealers are surely charging for the credit risk they assume when offering non-
margined derivatives. 
In a similar fashion, the Natural Gas Supply Association and National Corn 
Growers Association asserted that,  
Mandating clearing of over-the-counter derivatives (by forcing trading onto an 
exchange or mandating centralized clearing and margining for over-the counter 
derivatives) could drain the U.S. economy of approximately $900 billion in 
productive capital that companies would simply have to post or set aside to insure 
their risk-management transactions. NGSA (2010). 
This calculation, too, treats the non-margined derivatives as costless. The $900 billion is 
just the raw differential between the margin required under the mandate and the margin 
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without the mandate. It takes no account of the credit capacity consumed by a non-
margined derivative.2 
In January 2010, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), together with a number of 
other lobbying organizations, assembled a package of illustrations of how a margin 
mandate would impact individual end-users operating in different sectors of the energy 
industry—EEI (2010). One of the examples is of a “large electric power company” 
seeking to enter into a fixed price power supply agreement with a utility for 300 
megawatts of power in 2012.3 Because of its credit rating and because of another 
derivative contract it has with its bank, the company posts no margin, according to EEI. 
But, under the margin mandate, it must post $6.6 million in initial margin and up to $66 
million in potential variation margin. The example goes on to detail additional potential 
costs. The EEI then translates these margin costs to an 8% increase in power costs. This 
example, too, treats the non-margined derivative’s drain on the company’s credit rating as 
costless. And it assigns a zero opportunity cost to the positive balance swap used to 
justify the zero margin on the initial derivative. A more reasonable calculation would 
incorporate these costs. But all of the examples assembled in EEI’s document overlook 
them. 
To a first approximation, the cost charged for the non-margined swap must be 
equal to the cost of funding the margin account. This follows from the fact that the non-
                                                 
2 Back-up to the calculations provided in personal correspondence. 
 
3 The example cited begins on page 23. 
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margined swap just includes funding of the margin account as an embedded feature of the 
package. Therefore, the incremental cost to the hedger from a margin mandate is zero.4 
Dynamic Adjustment 
We have written that a non-margined swap is equivalent to a package of (i) a 
margined swap, plus (ii) a contingent line of credit to fund the margin. It is worth 
emphasizing the contingent nature of the line of credit. In our examples, we have shown 
only two scenarios for how the index underlying the derivative might move over the life 
of the contract. Looking at the two drawdowns of the credit line in Table 3, one can see 
the contingent character. The true range of potential drawdowns is much larger—as large 
as the range of movement in the underlying index. What is the size of the contingent 
credit line associated with the margined swap in Table 3, and how does it compare to the 
implicit contingent credit line embedded in the non-margined swap is Table 1? If the non-
margined swap is truly a fully non-margined swap, then the dealer bank can calculate its 
maximum exposure, and this tells us what is the size of the implicit contingent credit line. 
In our example this is $820 million. For the package in Table 3 to fully replicate the non-
margined swap, the credit line must have a limit of $820 million.  
In practice, so-called non-margined swaps are actually accompanied by various 
limits on the size of the accrued liability, so that there is a much lower limit on the 
implicit credit line embedded in the swap. Once the limit is reached, the company will 
either have to start posting margin, liquidate the swap, or otherwise adjust the position. 
                                                 
4 A study by the economics consulting firm NERA is unique in taking a somewhat different tack to 
estimating the differential cost of funding margin—NERA (2011). That tack has other problems as detailed 
in these two blog posts: http://bettingthebusiness.com/2012/01/22/phantom-costs-to-the-swap-dealer-
designation-and-otc-reform/ and http://bettingthebusiness.com/2012/03/19/nera-doubles-down/.  
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In practice, a company using margined swaps and funding margin calls from a 
credit line is unlikely to fully specify all contingencies and the full scale of the potential 
call on a credit line up front. It will often start out with one credit limit, and then 
dynamically adjust the size of the explicit credit line as the line is drawn down or paid 
off. Consequently, one needs to take care in making comparisons between a specific non-
margined swap and a specific margined swap funded with a credit line. In order for the 
two packages to be truly equal, the full dynamic structure of the position needs to be 
taken into account. 
In the course of public debate on these issues, some critics of the margin mandate 
have been forced to acknowledge the ability of the financial system to supplement the 
margin mandate with a line of credit. But these critics have then attempted to make much 
of the contingent nature of the credit line. For example, the Coalition for Derivatives 
End-Users filed a July 2011 Comment Letter with various regulatory agencies repeating 
portentous calculations of the cost of margining like those cited above, but nominally 
addressing the possibility that the required margin could be funded with a line of credit 
that is comparable to the implicit credit embedded in the non-margined swap. But they 
argue that  
… end-users need certainty and liquidity to manage their balance sheets. But the 
amount of margin borrowed and costs associated with a margin lending facility 
cannot be known upfront. The amount cannot be known because it depends on 
market fluctuations. The costs cannot be known because lenders typically base 
credit fees on a floating interest rate, plus a credit spread. Thus, the total cost of a 
margin lending facility vary based on the unpredictable amount needed to be 
borrowed and the unpredictable interest cost of that borrowing. 
Second, lenders will typically limit how much can be borrowed, much like a 
credit limit on a consumer credit card. The exact limit must be high enough to 
cover at least two or three standard deviations worth of price movements in the 
underlying derivatives portfolio. Lenders, however, will want to pass on the 
higher costs associated with offering high limits. This creates an incentive for 
 Page 18 
both lenders and end-users to agree on a lower limit that covers mark-to-market 
movements typically observed in normal market conditions. Should the margin 
requirement ever exceed the limit, however, as might occur in stressed market 
conditions, end-users will still face unfunded margin requirements that margin 
lending facilities cannot cover. Coalition for Derivative End-Users (2011). 
But these and their other arguments miss the power of the equivalence argument we made 
above. We are not proposing credit facilities as a tool for partially amelioriating a cost 
created by a margin mandate. Rather, we are pointing out that the true cost is already 
embedded in non-margined derivatives as currently offered in the OTC market. Each of 
the concerns expressed about a new margin lending facility applies equally to non-
margined swaps. When an end-user is negotiating a non-margined swap with a bank, the 
ultimate size of the credit that may be extended cannot be known because it depends on 
market fluctuations. Similarly, OTC dealers will typically limit how much can be 
borrowed through non-margined derivatives. The public debate often casually discusses 
the OTC swap market as if all swaps are non-margined and as if there are no limits. But 
this casual description belies the facts. A large portion of swaps do include margining, 
and virtually all swaps are negotiated under a master agreement that incorporates a total 
exposure limit! The danger that will face end-users in stressed market conditions is a 
danger they already face in a world without a margin mandate. End-users already 
occasionally find themselves bumping up against their exposure limits and forced to 
decide either to close out or modify a hedge, or to find extra funds to post as margin so as 
not to exceed exposure limits.  
It is worth emphasizing one more time that a non-margined derivative is just a 
package of two components: a margined derivative and a contingent line of credit. Under 
a margin mandate, the only contingent credit line that an end-user needs is the very 
contingent credit line already implicitly embedded in the non-margined derivative. There 
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are no additional burdens, costs or constraints that are not already present in the OTC 
market without a margin mandate. Therefore, the dynamic feature of the problem does 
not create any costs for a margin mandate. 
Cash and Non-cash Collateral 
The way the margin mandate is structured, it has generally required that cash be 
posted as collateral. Before the mandate, the dealer bank could secure its derivative trades 
with a company using the company’s business assets. Some opponents of the reform, 
especially the dealer banks, that this offered the companies a lower cost alternative. For 
example, Blythe Masters of J.P. Morgan explains that: 
Exposure to end-users that is either secured by assets that a clearinghouse can’t 
accept (e.g. property, reserves, equipment, commodities) or is unsecured [,] does 
not pose a systemic risk. From the standpoint of the end-users, the ability to 
pledge this kind of collateral or to transact on an unsecured basis is very 
favorable, as it allows them to enter into risk management using the assets that 
they own in their businesses with no disruption to those businesses and without 
draining their liquidity to come up with cash. From the standpoint of the dealers, 
exposure to these end-users often is what is referred to as “right way risk” in that 
the exposure moves in the same direction as the value of the collateral or the 
overall business. For example, if a natural gas producer wants to hedge its 
production, it will enter into a natural gas swap with J.P.Morgan in which it pays 
J.P.Morgan a floating price and receives a fixed price, and it might pledge its gas 
reserves as collateral to secure the swap. If gas prices go up, J.P.Morgan has 
increased credit exposure on the swap, but the value of its collateral also has 
increased and the overall enterprise value of the producer has increased, so from a 
credit standpoint J.P.Morgan does not face increased risk. The mitigation from 
right-way risk applies to unsecured exposure as well – if an exposure is “right 
way” a dealer is more likely to extend unsecured credit because the client’s 
overall credit-worthiness tends to improve as the exposure grows. Masters (2009). 
This argument fails to address the fact that the margin mandate merely forces a 
separation of the transaction into component parts: the margined swap and a line of 
credit. The mandate only requires that the margin account be in cash, and says nothing 
about the terms of the line of credit. The bank is free to set those terms as it sees fit. It can 
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accept as security any of the assets mentioned (e.g. property, reserves, equipment, 
commodities). Or, it can leave the credit line unsecured, based on its assessment of the 
underlying “right way risk” in the company’s line of business. So the margin mandate 
doesn’t meaningfully restrict the financial services that can be sold to the company. It 
only requires that they be unbundled and accounted for separately. Indeed, since the 
reform has been underway, a number of dealers have begun marketing new financial 
products in which the company posts collateral in various forms and the bank funds cash 
margin accounts.   
4. INSTITUTIONIAL PRACTICE 
We have argued that a non-margined derivative is equivalent in economic 
substance to the package of (i) a margined swap, plus (ii) a contingent line of credit to 
fund the margin. Because they are economically equivalent, the true cost to the company 
seeking to hedge must be the same. However, this doesn’t preclude there being 
secondary, institutional factors such that the two economically equivalent transactions are 
treated differently in important ways that result in the company paying different costs on 
a non-margined swap than it pays on a margined swap. Two key institutions to consider 
are accounting rules and bank regulations. 
Accounting  
Is there any difference in the accounting for a non-margined swap and a package 
of (i) a margined swap, plus (ii) a contingent line of credit to fund the margin? The focus 
here is on the accounting at the non-financial company hedging with the swap. Tables 4, 
5 and 6 show the accounting impact of the three different hedges described in Tables 1, 2 
and 3. Our focus is on comparing Table 4 and Table 6. 
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First, as the swap plays out over time, accruing either a mark-to-market loss or 
gain, in both cases the company’s accounts will show these on the balance sheet. In this 
respect, the non-margined swap and the package of a margined swap with a contingent 
line of credit are identical. 
Second, as shown in Table 6, the company with the margined swap will show the 
balance of its margin account as an encumbered cash asset, and there will appear an 
offsetting liability for the balance outstanding on the credit line. As shown in Table 4, the 
company with the non-margined swap will show neither of these entries. Therefore, 
although the net asset/liability position shown on the balance sheet is the same for the 
two companies, the gross values shown differ. 
Third, and finally, as shown in Table 6, the company with the explicit contingent 
credit line will mention the unused portion of the credit line in the notes to the financial 
statement. The company in Table 1, with the non-margined swap that includes an implicit 
contingent credit line, will not report such information. 
These two differences could lead management to prefer hedging using non-
margined derivatives for a number of reasons. Management might be deceived about 
costs by the fact that the contingent credit associated with a non-margined swap is not 
explicitly recognized in the financial statements. Or, management might prefer that 
shareholders are not fully informed. The differential treatment might also have an impact 
through ratios embedded in bond covenants or other contractual relationships. It is hard to 
make a case that any group of market participants would be consistently deceived about 
value and cost; instead it is a case of whether parties have more or less information. A 
margin mandate forces a more explicit description of the company’s credit situation. It is 
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hard to imagine a cogent public policy argument being made in favor of maintaining the 
less informative system of non-margined derivatives. 
Bank Regulations 
Probably the most important issues in how the dealer bank accounts for the two 
types of transactions pertain to the various capital regulations and other supervisory 
controls. Do the bank’s supervisory authorities see the implicit credit line embedded in 
the non-margined swap? Is it treated the same as an explicit contingent line of credit? Is 
one channel for credit run through the banking book, where credit risk and the associated 
capital requirements are calculated one way, while the other is calculated in the trading 
book, where credit risk and the associated capital requirements are calculated in a 
different way. In that case, the cost to the bank of providing the credit might vary 
according to the channel through which the credit is offered. 
It appears that in the past the authorities may not have taken full account of the 
volatile credit risk banks assumed when selling non-margined swap. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) concluded that,   
…the regulatory capital treatment for counterparty credit risk was insufficient in 
the following areas. 
• Mark-to-market losses due to credit valuation adjustments (CVA) were not 
directly capitalised. Roughly two-thirds of CCR losses were due to CVA losses 
and only about one-third were due to actual defaults. The current framework 
addresses CCR as a default and credit migration risk, but does not fully account 
for market value losses short of default. 
• Initial margining typically was very low at the start of the crisis and increased 
rapidly during the turmoil. This had a destabilising effect on many market 
participants and sometimes caused or precipitated defaults. Capital based on 
Effective expected positive exposure (EPE) did not provide sufficient incentive 
for adequate initial margins to be required at all points of the cycle. 
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If regulators treat the credit risk associated with the non-margined swap more leniently 
than the credit risk associated with the contingent credit line funding a margin account, 
then obviously the cost charged to the company for the non-margined swap may be less 
than the cost charged for a margined swap. This is not a true social savings, since the cost 
of the credit risk is loaded onto the financial system and the taxpayer backstop. But 
nevertheless, it is a savings from the point of view of the non-financial company. 
This last point needs to be acknowledged in the debate over how banking 
supervisors treat the implicit credit embedded in non-margined derivatives. In 
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, a number of regulators in April 2011 proposed a rule 
regarding swap margin and capital requirements for dealers, as opposed to the margin 
requirement for end-users—Federal Reserve (2011). Many end-users, as well as the 
dealers, would like the banking supervisors and other regulators to allow the banks to sell 
non-margined derivatives to end-users without the banks themselves being forced to fully 
recognize the implicit credit embedded in the derivative and without having to maintain a 
corresponding capital cushion to cover the associated credit risk. This has motivated the 
U.S. House of Representatives to pass HR2682, directing banking supervisors to 
overlook the credit risk embedded in non-margined swaps sold to end-users and others. 
The Senate has not yet taken up this proposal. Were a bill like this to pass, it would create 
a real cost differential favoring the sale of non-margined derivatives over the sale of a 
margined derivative with an associated contingent line of credit. But the differential 
would reflect a cross subsidy stemming from the differential regulatory treatment and not 
a cost differential reflecting a true difference in social cost. 
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5. HISTORY OF MARGIN REGULATION 
It is useful to put the current debate about derivative margin regulation into 
historical context. Many of the issues at the fore of the debate over the end-user 
exemption have arisen in another form in previous eras in the evolution of derivative 
markets. Although this paper is not the place for a comprehensive history of margin 
practice and regulation, we try to accurately characterize the key events and debates that 
will ring relevant to the current discussion. Looking back, we think there are three points 
that are relevant.  
First, the practice of margining is a natural feature of derivative trading arising out 
of the need to assure the integrity of the contract and payments of obligations, but parties 
to individual transactions have often been given significant discretion to determine the 
margin they would require.  
Second, mandatory minimum margins arise from the shift to central counterparty 
clearing at the turn of the 20th century, and also from the public interest in the stable 
functioning of derivative markets. Throughout much of the 20th century margining was 
mandated. The rise of the OTC swaps market brought a return to the discretionary 
practice that had prevailed in the 19th century and into the 20th century. The current 
reforms represent a shift back again to the practices that prevailed through much of the 
20th century. 
Third, there have been recurrent debates over whether margin requirements could 
be set in order to dampen speculation and volatility in derivative markets. These debates 
repeatedly confront the fact that the real issue is the availability of credit and whether the 
regulations governing margin are an effective constraint on traders. As the U.S. economy 
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has matured, regulators have tended to minimize the impact of margin rules on the level 
of derivative trading, so that the focus is returned to the integrity of the contract and the 
stable functioning of the derivative market. This matches our argument here which 
emphasizes that the margin mandate does not increase the cost of hedging since modern 
capital markets can readily substitute an explicit line of credit for the implicit credit 
embedded in the non-margined derivative. 
Among the very first rules of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) for which we 
have a record is one from May 1865 setting out the terms for posting margin. It reads: 
On all time contracts made between members of this association satisfactory 
margins may be demanded by either party, not to exceed 10% on the value of the 
article bought or sold on the day such margin is demanded, said margin to be 
deposited at such place or with such person as may be mutually agreed upon. 
Such margin may be demanded on or after the date of contract, and from time to 
time as may be deemed necessary to fully protect the party calling for same. 
Should the party called upon for margin, as herein provided, fail to respond within 
twenty-four hours thereafter, it shall be optional with the party making such call 
to consider the contract filled at the market value of the article on the day said call 
is made, and all differences between said market value and the contract price shall 
be settled the same as though the contract had fully expired. Taylor (1917) v. I, p. 
325. 
A nearly identical version of this rule was included as a part of the new system of 
General Rules and By-Laws passed at a special meeting in October 1865 that represented 
a key milestone in the development of standardized futures contracts. As commodity 
futures trading developed in other locations and for other commodities, these other 
exchanges developed similar margin rules. For example, records show that at least as far 
back as 1877, the Kansas City Board of Trade allowed members to charge a margin of 
10% on trades.5  An observer writing about commodity exchange operations in 1896 
mentions margining as a feature of the New York Coffee Exchange, the New York 
                                                 
5 Scott (1948), p. 99. 
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Cotton Exchange, the New York Produce Exchange and at exchanges in Chicago, St. 
Louis, Minneapolis, Toledo and elsewhere.6 
Initially, exchange rules simply gave traders the right to demand margin, but this 
right could be exercised at their discretion as noted in the account of one observer in 
1911,  
The actual practice of calling cash margins in grain transactions, as in the case of 
margin calls on stocks, depends largely upon the financial responsibility of the 
parties. In many trades between members, where each is perfectly confident of the 
other’s financial stability, the calling of margins is unnecessary, and is often 
disregarded. The contract is allowed to run with very little attention paid to this 
matter. On the other hand, where the parties to the deal are not so responsible, 
margins are frequently called…When a member of the Exchange makes contracts 
for the account of an outside party it is customary to call upon the latter for the 
initial deposit of ten per cent and require him to keep this deposit good. The 
calling of margins does not depend upon any set rule, but is determined by the 
parties to each individual transaction.7 
Hence, just as with OTC derivatives pre-Dodd-Frank, the parties could leave the contract 
un-margined.8 
Elements of enforced standardization arise from two forces. First, there is the shift 
to central counterparty clearing that began in the late 19th century. Because the 
clearinghouse steps in as the counterparty to all member trades, it becomes necessary to 
develop a single set of rules governing the margins that members will post with the 
clearinghouse. In addition, the use of a common clearinghouse invites a collective 
decision among members about the margins that members will require from their 
customers. Second, there is the public interest in the significant economic role played by 
                                                 
6 Emery (1896), p. 72. 
 
7 Harris (1911), p. 39. 
 
8 See also Federal Trade Commission (1920b), p. 161 and p. 206, and Boyle (1921) p. 85. 
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futures markets. Public debate naturally focuses on margin rules as an important 
determinant of the stability of the markets.  
In 1891, the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce was the first U.S. exchange to 
implement central counterparty clearing.9 Exchanges in other cities gradually followed 
suit. As new futures exchanges were established, central counterparty clearing was often 
the chosen structure right from the start. This was the case at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME), for example, established in 1919 for trade in butter, eggs and other 
products.10 Nevertheless, the largest exchange of them all, the CBOT, remained a holdout 
against central counterparty clearing. But finally, in 1925, succumbing in part to 
government pressure, the CBOT, too, made the switch.11 From this point, central 
counterparty clearing was standard practice for derivatives trading in the U.S., and 
remained so for the next 50 years, until the arrival of the OTC swaps market in the last 
quarter of the 20th century.12 
In the early 1900s a few exchanges required that all members charge customers a 
minimum margin.13 Beginning with the Great Depression, Federal authorities made a 
                                                 
9 Federal Trade Commission (1920b), p. 227. 
 
10 Irwin (1954) pp. 39-42. 
 
11 Norman (2011), p. 103 ff. The Federal Trade Commission (1920b), favorably contrasts the Minneapolis 
Exchange’s “more highly developed and more economical clearing house” with the CBOT’s older system. 
The Federal Trade Commission (1926), p. 283, notes the CBOT’s 1925 decision to adopt complete clearing 
with the comment that “The Chicago Board of Trade has been backward in adopting the complete clearing 
system.” 
 
12 Hoffman (1932), p. 198 cites the Toledo Produce Exchange (seed futures) as an exception. 
 
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1984), pp. 55-56. Irwin (1954) pp. 34-35 reports that 
“By approximately 1900, the New York Mercantile Exchange had provided that sales of butter or eggs 
made on the exchange for future delivery should be evidenced by a standard contract signed by both parties 
and that margins equal to 10 percent of the contract price should be deposited by both parties with the 
Superintendant of the Exchange.” and that “Then in July, 1916 the [Chicago Butter and Egg] Board voted 
almost unanimously to allow members to buy and sell for delivery at any time in the future, but that all 
contracts for more than ten days in the future must be in writing, signed by both parties, and that a margin 
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number of efforts to establish this practice at all exchanges. Despite some resistance and 
vacillation, by 1941 it had become the near universal practice for derivatives trading in 
the U.S., and remained so, until the arrival of the OTC swaps market in the last quarter of 
the 20th century.14 The minimum level of margin required was set by the individual 
exchange and varied according to a number of things, including market conditions and 
episodic pressure from Federal authorities.15 It is said that at least in the mid- to late-20th 
century most members charged customers more than the minimum, accepting the 
minimum only for a few particularly safe ones.16 
The rules governing minimum margins charged to customers have generally made 
distinctions, notably differentiating the margin required for hedge, spread and speculative 
positions.17 
                                                                                                                                                 
of approximately a cent per dozen (a cent per pound for butter) must be deposited with the treasurer of the 
Board.” In 1919, when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was established as the successor to the Chicago 
Butter and Egg Board, its rules mandated a minimum margin in all trades between members and customers. 
Irwin (1954), p. 41. 
 
14 In 1933, the Secretary of Agriculture convened a conference of the exchanges to discuss the recent 
collapse of grain prices, and the establishment of adequate margin requirements was decided upon as a 
means for limiting excessive price fluctuations.  In 1934, the Code of Fair Competition for Grain 
Exchanges adopted under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) included a compulsory margin 
requirement of 10% adopted by 12 of the 14 grain futures exchanges. While the Supreme Court struck 
down the NIRA the year after, most of the exchanges continued to require a minimum margin from 
customers. However, the cotton exchanges and the CBOT, the largest grain exchange, did not. In 1938, the 
recently established Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) again pressed for minimum margins, which 
most of the exchanges voluntarily instituted. Exceptions included the New York Wool Top Exchange and 
the Chicago Open Board of Trade. See the statement of Walter R. Scott, Executive Vice President, Kansas 
City Board of Trade, Kansas City, Mo., in U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (1948), pp. 
100-101, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1984), pp. 55-56. Markham (1991), p. 72, 
citing a CEA report, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1941), Circular No. 604, Trading in Wool Top 
Futures. 
 
15 See Markham (1991). 
 
16 Board of Governors (1984), p. 73. 
 
17 See for example the 1933 margin rules described for the Kansas City Board of Trade in Scott (1948), p. 
100. 
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Public attention to margin rules has also focused on the question of whether the 
level of margin required should be set to speculation and volatility in derivative 
markets.18 As far back as the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 1920 report on Future 
Trading Operations in Grain, critics of the futures markets focused on the low margin 
requirements as the cause of destabilizing speculation.19 While the FTC report led 
directly to the Grain Futures Act of 1922, that Act provided no authority to regulate 
margins. Instead, it focused on establishing designated markets, the reporting of positions 
and creation of a designated regulator. In 1934, in the midst of the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt argued that “unregulated speculation in securities and in 
commodities was one of the most important contributing factors in the artificial and 
unwarranted ‘boom’ which had so much to do with the terrible conditions of the years 
following 1929.” He specifically urged the regulation of margin so that speculation “will 
of necessity be drastically curtailed.” Through the quirks of politics and history, he 
succeeded with respect to securities, but failed with respect to commodities: the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal government authority to regulate 
margins in stock trading, but the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 provided no similar 
authority with respect to trading in commodity futures. However, efforts to introduce 
margin regulation for the purpose of limiting speculation in commodity futures markets 
continued. For example, testifying before the Senate in 1948, the Secretary of Agriculture 
pointed out that: 
                                                 
18 The historical debate over margin regulations and speculation encompasses all types of trading, including 
trading by financial investors as well as financial intermediaries. The focus in this paper is on how margin 
rules affect the cost of trading derivatives by non-financial companies. Margin regulations can impact 
financial investors and financial intermediaries even if they do not significantly impact non-financial 
companies – for example, through the interplay with capital requirements and other constraints. 
 
19 Federal Trade Commission (1920b), pp. 156-157. 
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The Commodity Exchange Act recognizes that excessive speculation may cause 
sudden or unreasonable fluctuation in prices. It provides authority for fixing limits 
on the amount and commitment of individual speculators. Such limits, however, 
can affect directly only the trading of large operators. They cannot be made low 
enough to affect the mass trading of the thousands of small speculators without 
impairing the hedging facilities of the futures market. … In a boom period 
increased margins curb the entrance of speculative buyers with inadequate 
resources. Adequate margins also provide a cushion against forced liquidation 
which accentuates subsequent price declines. Adequate margins also deter mass 
short selling in periods of falling prices. 
However, once again, Congress granted no such authority. Markham (1991) reports that 
“Between 1948 and 1974, proposals to impose federal regulation of margins were raised 
in Congress and rejected on at least eight separate occasions.”  
From the 1970s, the debate continued, but with a new focus. Previously, 
derivative trading had been synonymous with commodities trading, so that a segregation 
of securities regulation and commodities regulation was workable. Then, in the 1970s and 
80s, a futures industry with its origin the world of commodity trading successfully 
introduced financial futures and options, forcing the question of two disparate regulatory 
systems, one for securities and one for securities derivatives.20 In particular, the stock 
market crash of 1987 highlighted the differential treatment of stocks and stock index 
futures. The Presidential Task Force created after the 1987 – the Brady Commission – 
reiterated the historic concerns of excessive speculative activity and concluded that 
margin levels should be rationalized across markets.21 The SEC advocated strongly in 
                                                 
20 In addition to different regulatory regimes, there is a different usage of the term ‘margin’ in equity 
markets and derivative markets. The different regimes and difference in usage sometimes leads industry 
participants to claim that there margins in the securities industry are completely different from margins in 
derivative markets. While the different usage means that one needs to take care in comparing statistics and 
rules, it is not correct to say that the two are completely different. In securities markets we are dealing with 
credit granted outright, while in derivative markets the credit is only contingent. Margin rules in securities 
markets govern how much credit can be granted, and in derivative markets margin rules determine how 
much contingent credit can be granted. 
  
21 Markham (1991) p. 118. 
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favor of this, but the CFTC continued to oppose it, along with the futures exchanges. In 
1988, President Reagan established a Working Group on the issue, which sought inter-
agency accommodation and avoided any new legislative action. If anything, the Working 
Group sided with the position of the futures exchanges that margins should be set to 
assure performance on the contracts and not to control the level of speculation. The mini-
crash of 1989 sharpened the issue once again, but without bringing about any new 
resolution. Treasury Secretary Brady and SEC Chairman Richard Breeden again 
advocated for authority. The SEC Chairman claimed that leverage created by low 
margins in stock index futures encouraged “rampant speculation” and caused “excess 
volatility”. However, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, expressed 
skepticism that setting margins higher than necessary to assure performance would 
“reduce excessive stock price volatility.”22 
In the early years of these various debates on margins and speculation, it was 
often taken for granted that raising margin requirements would decrease trading. In part 
that is because it was implicitly understood that credit extended by securities dealers and 
futures dealers was an important channel for credit that could not be easily replaced. But 
occasionally, the tie between the impact of margin requirements and the substitutability 
of alternative sources of credit was explicitly noted. For example, a 1938 Department of 
Agriculture report notes that “margin control would tend to restrict speculation,” but that 
“there is the possibility that speculators will accumulate large lines [of credit] if the 
unanticipated profit appear to justify the advancing of large margins.”23 The connection 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 Markham (1991), pp. 119-122. 
 
23 Mehl (1936). 
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between credit regulation and margin regulation was also reinforced in 1980 when in 
response to the silver crisis precipitated by the Hunt brothers, the Federal Reserve 
attempted to discourage speculation in commodity markets by directing banks not to 
issue loans on speculative trades.24 
The debate surrounding the rationalization of the regulations governing securities 
markets and futures markets forced the issue of the substitutability of alternative sources 
of credit to the addressed explicitly. In 1984, the Federal Reserve conducted a complete 
review of federal margin regulations, and its conclusions marked a major turning point on 
the issue. The Federal Reserve had long been responsible for supervising the margin 
regulations for the securities markets. It had insisted that its authority extended to futures 
trades in securities, although it had as yet not practically exercised that authority. 
However, while standing by the principle of its authority and its responsibility, the new 
study focused attention on how credit markets had evolved since the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act had given the Federal Reserve authority over margin accounts on stocks. 
Specifically, it noted the increased availability of credit of various forms that dwarfed the 
volume of credit granted through margin accounts, so that regulation of margin accounts 
could no longer have the same impact on the total level of speculative activity. Therefore, 
the Federal Reserve found that rationalization of the system might very well be 
implemented by moving in the direction of lower margins designed primarily to assure 
performance on the trade.25 The Treasury responded to the Federal Reserve Board study 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
24 Cited in Markham (1991), p. 89, fn. 202. 
 
25 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1984). See also the Volker letter cited by Markham 
(1991) pp. 98-99. 
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in like manner, stating that “whether or not the objectives of Congress in creating a 
system of federal securities margin regulation were valid in 1934, there no longer appears 
to be a need for such regulation today.” 26 
6. CONCLUSION 
We present a replication argument to show that a non-margined swap is 
equivalent to a package of (i) a margined swap, plus (ii) a contingent line of credit. A 
mandate to clear and therefore to margin derivative trades forces derivative dealers to 
market these two components separately, but otherwise makes no additional demand on 
non-financial corporations. Therefore, a clearing and margin mandate does not add any 
real costs to a non-financial corporation seeking to hedge its commercial risk. 
Non-financial companies focus on the cost of posting margin. We point out, 
however, that this is just confusing the messenger with the message. Posting margin is 
costly, but the cost comes from the credit risk inherent in hedging. Non-margined 
derivatives embed this same cost in the price terms of the derivative. Margined 
derivatives force this cost to be priced separately and explicitly in the line of credit that 
must be raised. 
The replication argument shows that the first-order cost imposed on non-financial 
corporations by a clearing and margin mandate is zero. However, there may be second 
order costs that arise if other institutions treat the credit implicit in a non-margined 
derivative different from the credit in a margined derivative. We discuss how accounting 
regulations and bank capital regulations may give rise to some differences. We also place 
                                                 
26 Cited by Markham (1991) pp. 98. 
 
 Page 34 
the current debate in the context of the longer history of debate over the rules for 
margining derivatives. 
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Cash Flows on a Non-Margined Swap
Swap terms:
[1] Trade date: November 2010
[2] Payment date: February 2011
[3] Floating price: Oil futures price, contract for March 2011 delivery
[4] Fixed price: $82.00 (March contract price on trade date)
[5] Notional quantity: 10 million barrels
[6] Margin required: None
Scenario #1: falling price
[7] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[8] March Contract Price 82.00 81.00 80.00 79.00
[9] MTM Value 0.0 -10.0 -20.0 -30.0
[10] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 -30.0 -30.0
Scenario #2: rising price
[11] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[12] March Contract Price 82.00 83.00 84.00 85.00
[13] MTM Value 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0
[14] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0
Table 2
Cash Flows on a Margined Swap
Swap terms:
[1] Trade date: November 2010
[2] Payment date: February 2011
[3] Floating price: Oil futures price, contract for March 2011 delivery
[4] Fixed price: $82.00 (March contract price on trade date)
[5] Notional quantity: 10 million barrels
[6] Margin required: 15 % of the notional value, less the mark-to-market value
Scenario #1: falling price
[7] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[8] March Contract Price 82.00 81.00 80.00 79.00
[9] MTM Value 0.0 -10.0 -20.0 -30.0
[10] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 -30.0 -30.0
[11] 15% of Notional 123.0 121.5 120.0 0.0
[12] Margin Balance Required 123.0 131.5 140.0 0.0
[13] Margin Cash Flow -123.0 -8.5 -8.5 140.0 0.0
[14] Net Cash Flow -123.0 -8.5 -8.5 110.0 -30.0
Scenario #2: rising price
[15] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[16] March Contract Price 82.00 83.00 84.00 85.00
[17] MTM Value 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0
[18] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0
[19] 15% of Notional 123.0 124.5 126.0 0.0
[20] Margin Balance Required 123.0 114.5 106.0 0.0
[21] Margin Cash Flow -123.0 8.5 8.5 106.0 0.0
[22] Net Cash Flow -123.0 8.5 8.5 136.0 30.0
Table 3
Cash Flows on a Margined Swap + a Contingent Line of Credit
Swap terms:
[1] Trade date: November 2010
[2] Payment date: February 2011
[3] Floating price: Oil futures price, contract for March 2011 delivery
[4] Fixed price: $82.00 (March contract price on trade date)
[5] Notional quantity: 10 million barrels
[6] Margin required: 15 % of the notional value, less the mark-to-market value
Scenario #1: falling price
[7] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[8] March Contract Price 82.00 81.00 80.00 79.00
[9] MTM Value 0.0 -10.0 -20.0 -30.0
[10] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 -30.0 -30.0
[11] 15% of Notional 123.0 121.5 120.0 0.0
[12] Margin Balance 123.0 131.5 140.0 0.0
[13] Margin Cash Flow -123.0 -8.5 -8.5 140.0 0.0
[14] Credit Line Withdrawals / Payments 123.0 8.5 8.5 -140.0
[15] Credit Line Balance 123.0 131.5 140.0 0.0
[16] Net Cash Flow 0.0 0.0 0.0 -30.0 -30.0
[17] Difference from Non-Margined Swap 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Scenario #2: rising price
[18] Date Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Total
[19] March Contract Price 82.00 83.00 84.00 85.00
[20] MTM Value 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0
[21] Swap Payment 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0
[22] 15% of Notional 123.0 124.5 126.0 0.0
[23] Margin Balance 123.0 114.5 106.0 0.0
[24] Margin Cash Flow -123.0 8.5 8.5 106.0 0.0
[25] Credit Line Withdrawals / Payments 123.0 -8.5 -8.5 -106.0
[26] Credit Line Balance 123.0 114.5 106.0 0.0
[27] Net Cash Flow 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0






Total cash 200 20 Gross derivative liabilities
Gross derivative assets 0 640 Other liabilities
Other assets 960 660 Total liabilities
500 Equity
Total 1,160 1,160 Total
Notes to the Financial Statement:
Ratios:
Cash to Total Assets 17%






Cash in margin account 140 20 Gross derivative liabilities
Other cash 200 640 Other liabilities
Total cash 340 660 Total liabilities
Gross derivative assets 0 640 Equity
Other assets 960
Total 1,300 1,300 Total
Notes to the Financial Statement:
Ratios:
Cash to Total Assets 26%




with Margined Derivative + Line of Credit
Assets Liabilities
Cash in margin account 140 140 Used line of credit
Other cash 200 20 Gross derivative liabilities
Total cash 340 640 Other liabilities
Gross derivative assets 0 800 Total liabilities
Other assets 960 500 Equity
Total 1,300 1,300 Total
Notes to the Financial Statement:
Undrawn amount on line of credit: 680
Ratios:
Cash to Total Assets 26%
Liabilities to Total Assets 62%
